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It treats M&A as one form of boundary choice over innovative assets and people, alongside licensing, alliances, corporate venture capital, minority stakes, inventor mobility, and acqui-hires. Synthesizing evidence from finance, industrial organization, strategy, and sector studies, the review explains why firm boundaries matter for knowledge flows; how innovation shapes who buys whom; and how acquisition markets affect inventive effort, start-up exits, and the build-versus-buy boundary. Post-M&A outcomes are heterogeneous because deals are selected matches and innovation has multiple margins: R&D effort, patenting, novelty, exploration, exploitation, commercialization, diffusion, and human capital reallocation. The review closes by linking property rights and labor market perspectives on inventors, teams, mobility, acqui-hiring, and labor market power and by outlining a policy-relevant agenda.</p> 89<div class="links"> 90<a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-111524-010046" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 91</div> 92</article></div></div> 93<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000023"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 94<h3>Technological Obsolescence Risk in Household Credit: Evidence from the Transition to Electric Mobility</h3> 95<p class="author">joint with <a href="https://www.bo-bian.com/" target="_blank">Bo Bian</a> and <a href="https://huan-tang.com/" target="_blank">Huan Tang</a>
95, May 2026, Journal of Financial Economics, accepted.</p> 96<p>Using comprehensive auto loan data, we show that hybridsârelative to internalcombustion 97counterparts within the same model seriesâare financed with higher interest 98rates, lower loan-to-value ratios, and shorter maturities. These gaps reflect hybridsâ 99lower and more volatile resale values, driven by rapid, innovation-induced depreciation 100of early electric-vehicle components. Lenders revise residual values more often and 101downward for hybrids, consistent with greater collateral risk. Linking loan pricing 102to patent-based measures of electric-vehicle innovation and a global reclassification of 103hybrid-control patents, we show that technological obsolescence raises financing costs during the transition to electric mobility.</p> 104<div class="links"> 105<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4526150" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 106</div> 107</article></div></div> 108<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000003"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 109<h3>Machines Could Not Compete with Chinese Labor: Evidence from U.S. Firms' Innovation</h3> 110<p class="author">joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/elenasimintzi/home" target="_blank">Elena Simintzi</a>, May 2025, Review of Finance, Volume 19, Issue 6, p. 1619â1661, (Editorâs Choice).</p> 111<p>We study how multinational firms' access to offshore labor affects their decisions to develop new production technologies. The 1999 U.S.-China bilateral agreement improved contracting institutions in China, reducing uncertainty for U.S. multinationals and enabling cheaper labor sourcing through FDI. Using data from U.S. parent companies and their Chinese subsidiaries, we show that U.S. firms expanded their Chinese operations and increased subsidiaries' profitability post-agreement. Our novel measure reveals that U.S. multinationals reduced process innovations after the agreement. These findings highlight the impact of cross-border labor sourcing on domestic technological development, highlighting that production and technological choices of multinationals are jointly determined.</p> 112<div class="links"> 113<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613248" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 114<a href="https://academic.oup.com/rof/article/29/6/1619/8305171" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 115</div> 116</article></div></div> 117<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000004"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 118<h3>Shielding Firm Value: Employment Protection and Process Innovation</h3> 119<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/hortizmolinaubc/home" target="_blank">Hernan Ortiz-Molina</a> and <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/elenasimintzi/home" target="_blank">Elena Simintzi</a>), November 2022, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 146, Issue 2, p. 637-664.</p> 120<p>Following state-level legal changes that increase labor dismissal costs, firms increase their innovation in new processes that facilitate the adoption of cost-saving production methods, especially in industries with a large share of labor costs in total costs. Firms with high innovation ability exhibit larger increases in process innovation and capital labor ratiosâan effect driven by both increases in capital investment and decreases in employment. By facilitating the adjustment of the input mix when conditions in input markets change, innovation ability allows firms to mitigate value losses and is a key driver of their performance.</p> 121<div class="links"> 122<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3223176" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a>
123<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.10.005" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 124</div> 125</article></div></div> 126<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000005"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 127<h3>The International Propagation of Economic Downturns Through Multinational Companies: The Real Economy Channel</h3> 128<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://www.business.rutgers.edu/faculty/serdar-dinc" target="_blank">Serdar Dinc</a> and <a href="https://fisher.osu.edu/people/erel-koksal.1" target="_blank">Isil Erel</a>), October 2022, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 146, Issue 1, p. 277-304.</p> 129<p>We study how non-financial multinational companies propagate economic declines from their subsidiaries located in countries experiencing an economic downturn to subsidiaries in countries not experiencing one. We find that investment is 18% lower in subsidiaries of these parents relative to the same-industry, same-country subsidiaries of parents that are headquartered in the same parent country but do not have a subsidiary in a country experiencing an economic downturn. The employment growth rate in the affected subsidiaries is zero or negative while it is 1.4% in the subsidiaries of unaffected parents. The aggregate industry-level sales and employment are also negatively impacted in the countries of the affected subsidiaries.</p> 130<div class="links"> 131<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962389" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 132<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.005" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 133</div> 134</article></div></div> 135<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000016"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 136<h3>Corporate Innovation and Returns</h3> 137<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/lorenzogarlappi/" target="_blank">Lorenzo Garlappi</a>), August 2020, Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Volume 9, Issue 2, p. 340â383.</p> 138<p>Among U.S. public firms, technological innovation is concentrated in a small set of large players, with innovation âleadersâ having considerably lower systematic risk than âlaggards.â To under- stand this fact, we build a winner-takes-all patent-race model and show that a firmâs expected return decreases in its innovation output and increases in that of its rivals. Using a comprehensive firm-level panel of information on patenting activity by fields of technology in 1950-2010, we find strong support for the modelâs predictions. Our results highlight that strategic interactions among firms competing in innovation are an important determinant of risk and expected returns.</p> 139<div class="links"> 140<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3471692" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 141<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz012" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 142</div> 143</article></div></div> 144<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000015"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 145<h3>Are Foreign Investors Locusts? The Long-Term Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership</h3> 146<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://www2.novasbe.unl.pt/en/faculty-research/faculty/faculty-detail/id/69/miguel-ferreira" target="_blank">Miguel A. Ferreira</a>, <a href="http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty-research/directory/pedro-matos/" target="_blank">Pedro Matos</a>
146, and Pedro Pires), October 2017, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 126, Issue 1, p. 122-146.</p> 147<p>This paper challenges the view that foreign investors lead firms to adopt a short-term orientation and forgo long-term investment. Using a comprehensive sample of publicly listed firms in 30 countries over the 2001-2010 period, we find instead that greater foreign institutional ownership fosters long-term investment in tangible, intangible, and human capital. Foreign institutional ownership also leads to significant increases in innovation output. We identify these effects by exploiting the exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership that follows the addition of a firm to the MSCI indices. Our results suggest that foreign institutions exert a disciplinary role on entrenched corporate insiders worldwide.</p> 148<div class="links"> 149<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860849" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 150<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X17301526" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 151</div> 152</article></div></div> 153<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000014"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 154<h3>Competition and Ownership Structure of Closely-Held Firms</h3> 155<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/tingxu4" target="_blank">Ting Xu</a>), May 2017, Review of Financial Studies, Volume 30, Issue 5, p. 1583-1626.</p> 156<p>We study how product market competition affects firmsâ ownership structures using a large sample of closely-held firms in 18 European countries. We show that firms operating in more competitive environments have lower inside ownership and that the stakes of their outside shareholders are more dispersed. Competition diminishes inside shareholdersâ control of the firm and increases the dispersion of control rights among outside shareholders. Our findings suggest that, by changing corporate ownership structure, competition reduces incentive misalignment among shareholders, leading to better firm performance and gains in economic efficiency.</p> 157<div class="links"> 158<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2356526" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 159<a href="https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/30/5/1583/2929392/Competition-and-Ownership-Structure-of-Closely" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 160</div> 161</article></div></div> 162<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000013"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 163<h3>Heterogeneous Innovations, Firm Creation and Destruction, and Asset Prices</h3> 164<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/lorenzogarlappi/" target="_blank">Lorenzo Garlappi</a> and <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/patrickgruening1" target="_blank">Patrick Grüning</a>), June 2016, Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Volume 6, Issue 1, p. 46-87.</p> 165<p>We study the implications of the creative destruction lifecycle of innovation for asset prices. We develop a general equilibrium model of endogenous firm creation and destruction where 'incremental' innovations by incumbents and 'radical' innovations by entrants drive productivity improvements. Micro-founded incentives of firms to innovate lead to the joint equilibrium determination of time-varying economic growth and countercyclical economic uncertainty. The model quantitatively matches key properties of consumption and asset prices, as well as novel stylized facts on the process of creative destruction in the U.S. economy obtained using a comprehensive sample of patents over the 1975-2013 period. We show that the interplay between incumbents' and entrants' innovations, which is at the core of creative destruction, is an important determinant of risks that are priced in financial markets.</p> 166<div class="links"> 167<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574952" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 168<a href="http://raps.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/1/46.abstract" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 169</div> 170</article></div></div> 171<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000012"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 172<h3>Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions</h3> 173<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/kaili/home" target="_blank">Kai Li</a>), October 2014, Journal of Finance, Volume 69, Issue 5, p. 1923-1960.</p> 174<p>
174Using a large and unique patent-merger dataset over the period 1984 to 2006, we show that companies with large patent portfolios and low R&D expenses are acquirers, while companies with high R&D expenses and slow growth in patent output are target firms. Further, technological overlap between any two firms has a positive effect on transaction incidence, and this effect is reduced for firm pairs that overlap in product markets. We also show that acquirers with prior technological linkage to their target firms produce more patents afterwards. We conclude that synergies obtained from combining innovation capabilities are important drivers of acquisitions.</p> 175<div class="links"> 176<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917215" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 177<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.12059/abstract" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 178</div> 179</article></div></div> 180<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000011"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 181<h3>Pyramidal Ownership and the Creation of New Firms</h3> 182<p class="author">(joint with <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/hortizmolinaubc/home" target="_blank">Hernan Ortiz-Molina</a>), May 2013, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 108, Issue 3, p. 798-821.</p> 183<p>We study the role of pyramidal ownership structures in the creation of new firms. Our results suggest that pyramids arise because they provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash flows to outside financiers is limited. Parent companies supply inside funds to new firms which, due to large investment requirements and low pledgeable cash flows, cannot raise enough external financing. The financing advantage of pyramidal structures is pervasive in many countries, exists regardless of whether new firms are set up by business groups or by smaller organizations, and is an important underpinning of entrepreneurial activity.</p> 184<div class="links"> 185<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1681184" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Working paper</a> 186<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X13000263" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 187</div> 188</article></div></div> 189<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000010"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 190<h3>Financial Development and the Allocation of External Finance</h3> 191<p class="author">(joint with Peter Ondko), January 2012, Journal of Empirical Finance, Volume 19, Issue 1, p. 1-25 (lead article).</p> 192<p>We examine whether financial markets development facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. Using European micro-level data for 1996-2005, we show that firms in industries with growth opportunities use more external finance in financially more developed countries. This result is particularly strong for firms that are more likely to be financially constrained and dependent on domestic financial markets, such as small and young firms. Our findings are robust to controlling for te
192chnological determinants of external finance needs and to using different proxies for growth opportunities. Interestingly, the explanatory power of the measures of technological determinants identified in prior work decreases significantly once growth opportunities are controlled for.</p> 193<div class="links"> 194<a href="/?download=_/i.000010/20210111094603.benaondko.pdf"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Financial Development and the Allocation of External Finance (PDF, 459 kB)</a> 195<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539811000818" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 196</div> 197</article></div></div> 198<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000009"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 199<h3>Financial Development and Corporate Growth in the EU Single Market</h3> 200<p class="author">(joint with <a href="http://home.cerge-ei.cz/jurajda/" target="_blank">Å tÄpán Jurajda</a>), July 2011, Economica, Volume 78, Issue 311, p. 401-428.</p> 201<p>The establishment of the EU-15 âsingle marketâ in 1993 brought about a high degree of similarity in firmsâ growth opportunities across countries, while substantial diversity existed in the development of national financial markets. We compare within-industry growth rates of similar âsingle marketâ firms facing financial systems of different depth and institutional quality as of 1993. Moving from the least to the most developed financial market within the EU-15 boosts firmsâ annual value-added growth by about three percentage points. Our results also suggest that the growth gap due to initially underdeveloped financial systems was closed by 2003.</p> 202<div class="links"> 203<a href="/?download=_/i.000009/20210111094505.benajurajda.pdf"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Financial Development and Corporate Growth in the EU Single Market (PDF, 795 kB)</a> 204<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00822.x/abstract" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 205</div> 206</article></div></div> 207<div class="object-item paper-item box" id="object-anchor-i-000008"><div class="object-item-in paper-item-in"><article> 208<h3>Rent Extraction by Large Shareholders: Evidence Using Dividend Policy in the Czech Republic</h3> 209<p class="author">(joint with <a href="http://home.cerge-ei.cz/hanousek/" target="_blank">Jan Hanousek</a>), May 2008, Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 58, Issue 3-4, p. 106-130.</p> 210<p>Using cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing dividends paid across varying corporate ownership structures â concentration, type, and domicile of ownership â we quantify these effects and reveal that they are substantial. We find that the target payout ratio for firms with majority ownership is low, but that the presence of a significant minority shareholder increases the target payout ratio and hence precludes a majority owner from extracting rent. In contrast to other studies from developed markets, our unique dataset from the Czech Republic for the period 1996â2003 permits us to take account of endogeneity of ownership.</p> 211<div class="links"> 212<a href="/?download=_/i.000008/20210111094403.benahanousek.pdf"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Rent Extraction by Large Shareholders: Evidence Using Dividend Policy in the Czech Republic (PDF, 496 kB)</a> 213<a href="http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1125" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-arrow.svg" alt=""> Published version</a> 214</div> 215</article></div></div></div> 216<div class="block_bottom_browsing"></div> 217<div class="clear"><!-- --></div> 218 219</div> 220 </div> 221</main> 222</div> 223 224 225 <footer class="main"> 226<img src="/img/sys/footer-stripes.svg" id="footer-stripes"> 227 228 <div class="container" id="contact-form"> 229 <main> 230 <h2>Get in touch</h2> 231 <div class="contacts"> 232 <div class="box"> 233 <img src="/img/sys/icon-email.svg" alt="Envelope icon"> 234 <ul> 235 <li>Email:</li> 236 <li><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></li> 237 </ul> 238 </div> 239 <div class="box"> 240 <img src="/img/sys/icon-phone.svg" alt="Phone icon"> 241 <ul> 242 <li>Phone:</li> 243 <li><a href="tel:+16048228490" target="_blank">+1 (604) 822 8490</a></li> 244 </ul> 245 </div> 246 </div> 247 <div> 248<div><noscript><div class="warning">JAVASCRIPT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FOLLOWING FORM!!!</div></noscript></div><form action="/en/publications?odeslano=1#contact-form" method="post" class="form"> 249 <input type="hidden" name="page" value="id,research-p" /> 250 <input type="hidden" name="lang" value="en" /> 251 <input type="hidden" name="serial" value="1790900213iO0533" /> 252 <input type="hidden" name="action" value="submit" /> 253 <div class="row"> 254 <div class="item"> 255 <label for="fid_jmeno">Name</label> 256 <input title="Name" type="text" name="jmeno" id="fid_jmeno" value="" /> 257 </div> 258 <div class="item"> 259 <label for="fid_email">E-mail:*</label> 260 <input required="required" type="email" name="email" id="fid_email" value="" /> 261 </div> 262 <div class="item"> 263 <label for="fid_telefon">Phone</label> 264 <input pattern="[\d\s+]+" type="tel" name="telefon" id="fid_telefon" value="" /> 265 </div> 266</div> 267<div class="row"> 268 <div class="item"> 269 <label for="fid_message">Your message</label> 270 <textarea title="Your message" required="required" name="message" id="fid_message" cols="30" rows="5"></textarea> 271 </div> 272</div> 273<div style="display:none"><input type="checkbox" name="send" id="fid_send0" value="ano" title="Jsem robot" /><label for="fid_send0"> Jsem robot</label> 274 </div> 275 <div class="row"> 276 <button type="submit" class="btn btn-greendark"><span>Send</span></button> 277 </div> 278<span id="form-qpqyyw"><!-- --></span></form> 279 </div> 280 </main> 281 <footer> 282 <div class="left-box"> 283 <a href="https://www.sauder.ubc.ca/people/jan-bena" target="_blank">Visit UBC Sauder Faculty Profile</a> 284 </div> 285 <div class="right-box"> 286 <ul> 287 <li><a href="https://ca.linkedin.com/in/benajan/" target="_blank"><img src="/img/sys/icon-linkedin.svg" alt="LinkedIn icon">Linkedin</a></li> 288 <li>© Jan Bena 2021-2026</li> 289 </ul> 290 </div> 291 </footer> 292 </div> 293 294 </footer> 295</div>
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304<script src="/cms/js/main.min.js?1601531056"></script>
vendor: 1 bytes, line 304
304
305<script src="/cms/jquery-plugins/fancybox-3.3.5/jquery.fancybox.min.js?1534855512"></script>
vendor: 1 bytes, line 305
305
306<script src="/cms/js/forms2.js?1768986829"></script>
vendor: 1 bytes, line 306
306
307<script> 308var tiforms = {}; 309</script>
vendor: 1 bytes, line 309
309
310<script src="/js/project.js?1638486000"></script>
vendor: 1 bytes, line 310
310
311<script type="text/javascript"><!-- 312$(function(){(function(){var sets={minWidth:50,minHeight:50},clAL=function(current,previous){$('iframe',arguments[0].current.$content).data('ready',0);},clAS=function(current,previous){$('iframe',arguments[0].current.$content).get(0).contentWindow.document.location.hash+='';};sets.live=false;$('a.fancybox').each(function(){var $obj=$(this),fset={},fdset=$obj.data('fancybox-sets');if(window.TCO&&TCO.gallery_id&&$obj.data('gpic-id')){var $gobj=$('#'+TCO.gallery_id+' a[data-pic-id="'+$obj.data('gpic-id')+'"]');if($gobj.length){$obj.on('click',function(){$gobj.trigger('click.ext');return false;});return;}} 313$.extend(fset,sets);if(typeof(fdset)==='object'){$.extend(fset,fdset);} 314if($obj.hasClass('iframe')){fset.type='iframe';} 315if(fset.type==='iframe'&&$obj.attr('href').indexOf('#')>=0){fset.afterLoad=clAL;fset.afterShow=clAS;} 316$obj.fancybox(fset);});})();var form_options={"lang":"en","serial_settings":{},"id_prefix":"fid_","tr":{"nelze_pridat_prazdnou_hodnotu":"You cannot append empty value","file_input_preview":"Preview","form_expired":"The form has expired, the page must be reloaded.","hodnota_existuje":"Selected value already exists in the list","opravdu_smazat":"Really delete?","download":"Download","smazat":"Delete","kopirovat_obsah_confirm":"Preload from content?","ext_data_empty_confirm":"Primary key not found in external data, would you like to empty all related values?","zmeny_po_ulozeni":"changes will not take effect until saved","presunout":"Drag and drop","thumbnail":"Thumbn
316ail"},"cms_img_path":"\/cms\/img","project_dir":"\/","page":"research-p","sprava":""};form_options['form']=$('#form-qpqyyw').parents('form');tiforms['contact.form']=new Forms2(form_options);tiforms['contact.form'].form.data('forms',tiforms['contact.form']);tiforms['contact.form'].form.data('form-id','form-qpqyyw');tiforms['contact.form'].form.on('click','a.fancybox-live',function(){ti_lightbox.open(this.href);return false;});function initHtml5Messages(form){$("input, textarea, select",form).each(function(){let $input=$(this);let msg=$input.data("msg");if($input.prop("required")&&msg){$input.on("invalid",function(event){if(this.validity.valueMissing){this.setCustomValidity(msg);}}).on("input",function(event){this.setCustomValidity("");});}});} 317function initHtml5CustomValidators(form){$("[data-rule-equalto]",form).on("input",function(){var to_confirm=$(this);var to_equal=$(to_confirm.data("rule-equalto"));if(to_confirm.val()!=to_equal.val()){this.setCustomValidity(to_confirm.data("msg-equalto"));}else{this.setCustomValidity("");}});};initHtml5Messages($('#form-qpqyyw').parents('form'));initHtml5CustomValidators($('#form-qpqyyw').parents('form'));tiforms['contact.form'].onload();(function(){var obj=$('#form-qpqyyw').parents('form').find('input[name="serial"]');if(obj.length)obj.after('<'+'input type="hidden" name="t9735" value="4" />');})();$('#searchword').each(function(){var text_alert='Please enter a search term!';var search_input=$(this);search_input.parents('form').bind('submit',function(){if(search_input.val()==''){alert(text_alert);return false;} 318return true;});})}); 319// --></script>
319 320</body> 321</html>
Line numbers count LF bytes from the start of the resource, as the search results do. Vendor segments are library code the classifier recognised; they are stored but not indexed. Bytes are shown as Latin1 characters, one per byte.